Understanding Natech Risk Due to Storms - Analysis, Lessons Learned and Recommendations by NECCI AMOS et al.
  
 
 
Understanding Natech Risk Due 
to Storms 
Analysis, Lessons 
Learned and 
Recommendations 
Necci, A., Girgin, S., Krausmann, E. 
 
 
 
 
2018
EUR 29507 EN 
 This publication is a Technical report by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European Commission’s science 
and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policymaking 
process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission. Neither 
the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use that 
might be made of this publication. 
 
  
 
EU Science Hub 
https://ec.europa.eu/jrc 
 
 
JRC114176 
 
EUR 29507 EN 
 
    
PDF ISBN 978-92-79-98274-3 ISSN 1831-9424 doi:10.2760/21366 
 
 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2018  
 
© European Union, 2018  
 
The reuse policy of the European Commission is implemented by Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 
December 2011 on the reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Reuse is authorised, 
provided the source of the document is acknowledged and its original meaning or message is not distorted. The 
European Commission shall not be liable for any consequence stemming from the reuse. For any use or 
reproduction of photos or other material that is not owned by the EU, permission must be sought directly from 
the copyright holders. 
 
All content © European Union, 2018, except: NOAA Environmental Visualization Laboratory (cover image). 
Source: [https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov] 
Image 1, Jessica Weinkle, 2012. Source: [https://journals.ametsoc.org] 
Image 24, Defense Visual Information Center. Source: [https://catalog.archives.gov/id/6447021] 
Image 25, Brian Cumper/Defense Visual Information Center], 1989. Source: [https://catalog.archives.gov] 
Images 26, 33, and 34, LA DEQ and NOAA OR&R, 2005. Source: [https://incidentnews.noaa.gov] 
Images 27-29, USCG and NOAA OR&R, 2005. Source: [https://incidentnews.noaa.gov] 
Images 30, 35-38, and 40-42, NOAA OR&R, 2005. Source: [https://incidentnews.noaa.gov] 
Images 31-32, USCG and NOAA OR&R, 2005. Source: [https://incidentnews.noaa.gov] 
Image 39, flickr/Skytruth, 2008. Source: [https://www.flickr.com/photos/skytruth] 
Image 43, FEMA/Andrea Booher, 2002. Source: [https://www.fema.gov]  
 
 
How to cite this report: Necci, A., Girgin, S., Krausmann, E., Understanding Natech Risk Due to Storms – 
Lessons learned and recommendations, EUR 29507 EN, European Union, 2018, ISBN 978-92-79-98274-3, 
doi:10.2760/21366 (where available), JRC114176. 
  
 Contents 
Abstract ............................................................................................................... 1 
1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 2 
2 Storm categories and effects ............................................................................... 4 
2.1 Types of storm ............................................................................................ 4 
2.1.1 Tropical cyclones ................................................................................. 4 
2.1.2 Windstorms ......................................................................................... 5 
2.1.3 Polar lows ........................................................................................... 5 
2.1.4 Medicanes ........................................................................................... 6 
2.1.5 Thunderstorms .................................................................................... 6 
2.2 Climate change ........................................................................................... 6 
2.3 Effects of storms ......................................................................................... 6 
2.3.1 Wind action ......................................................................................... 6 
2.3.2 Heavy precipitation .............................................................................. 7 
2.3.3 Storm surge ........................................................................................ 7 
2.3.4 Lightning ............................................................................................ 7 
3 Natech Statistics................................................................................................ 8 
3.1 Data sources ............................................................................................... 8 
3.2 Method used ............................................................................................... 9 
4 Results ........................................................................................................... 10 
4.1 Analysis of Natech events ........................................................................... 10 
4.2 Analysis of storm-triggered Natech events .................................................... 12 
4.2.1 Storm-triggered Natech events in TAD ................................................. 13 
4.2.2 Storm-triggered Natech events in MHIDAS ............................................ 19 
4.2.3 Results summary ............................................................................... 26 
5 Analysis of accident case studies ....................................................................... 27 
5.1 Hurricane Hugo, Virgin Islands, 1989 ........................................................... 27 
5.2 Hurricane Katrina, USA, 2005 ...................................................................... 29 
5.2.1 Murphy Oil spill .................................................................................. 30 
5.2.2 Dynegy ............................................................................................. 31 
5.2.3 Shell Pilot Town ................................................................................. 31 
5.2.4 Shell Nairn ........................................................................................ 33 
5.2.5 Sundown Energy ................................................................................ 34 
5.2.6 Bass Enterprises ................................................................................ 34 
5.2.7 Chevron Empire ................................................................................. 35 
5.3 Hurricane Rita, USA, 2005 .......................................................................... 36 
5.4 Hurricane Ike, USA, 2008 ........................................................................... 36 
 5.5 Super-typhoon Pongsona, Guam, 2002 ........................................................ 41 
5.6 Cilacap refinery, Indonesia, 1995 ................................................................. 41 
5.7 Storm Surge, UK, 2013 .............................................................................. 42 
5.7.1 Inter Terminals Riverside Terminal ....................................................... 42 
5.7.2 SABIC UK Brinefields .......................................................................... 42 
5.7.3 Inter Terminals, Immingham ............................................................... 43 
5.8 Hurricane Harvey, USA, 2017 ...................................................................... 43 
5.8.1 The rain ............................................................................................ 44 
5.8.2 The damage ...................................................................................... 44 
5.8.3 The spills .......................................................................................... 44 
5.8.4 Rainwater treatment facilities overflows ................................................ 44 
5.8.5 Contaminated sites ............................................................................ 45 
5.8.6 Shut-down and restart ....................................................................... 45 
5.8.7 Communication and emergency response ............................................. 45 
5.8.8 Fire and explosion at Arkema .............................................................. 46 
5.9 La Plata refinery fire, Argentina ................................................................... 46 
6 Damage mode analysis .................................................................................... 48 
6.1 Roof damage ............................................................................................. 48 
6.2 Falling objects ........................................................................................... 49 
6.3 Vessel buckling .......................................................................................... 49 
6.4 Displacement ............................................................................................ 49 
6.5 Damage to electrical equipment .................................................................. 50 
6.6 Flotation ................................................................................................... 50 
6.7 Impact with floating objects ........................................................................ 50 
6.8 Impact with airborne objects ....................................................................... 50 
6.9 Sinking of floating roof ............................................................................... 51 
6.10 Power loss .......................................................................................... 51 
6.11 Breach/overfill ..................................................................................... 51 
6.12 Ignition of flammables .......................................................................... 51 
6.13 Thermal puncturing of metal enclosures ................................................. 52 
7 Lessons learned and recommendations .............................................................. 53 
8 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 55 
References ......................................................................................................... 56 
List of figures ...................................................................................................... 62 
List of tables ....................................................................................................... 64 
1 
Abstract 
As standards of living generally improve across the globe, there is a corresponding change 
in people’s perception and acceptance of risk. The impact of natural hazards is an emerging 
threat to industrial facilities, pipelines, offshore platforms and other infrastructure that 
handles, stores or transports hazardous substances. When accidentally released, 
hazardous substances can lead to fires, explosions, and toxic or radioactive releases. These 
so-called Natech accidents are a recurring but often overlooked feature of many natural 
disasters and have often had significant human, environmental and economic impacts. 
Industries and authorities must be able to learn from incidents and capture the lessons 
that are needed to safely conduct business and produce goods for the whole of society.  
Among natural events, storms can seriously affect the integrity of an industrial installation 
and lead to accident scenarios such as fires, explosions and the dispersion of chemicals in 
the environment. In addition, scientists expect an overall worsening of extreme weather 
events in this century due to climate change, which will further increase the threat to 
industrial facilities. 
This report analyses past technological incidents with hazardous materials releases and 
damage to industrial facilities caused by the impact of storms. It discusses the vulnerability 
of industrial sites including that of the main equipment types present at the facility and 
analyses how they are damaged. 
The first part of the report describes the storm hazard. It discusses storm types and their 
occurrence, as well as the main effects that cause damage to human settlements and the 
environment. The report lists strong winds, heavy precipitation, lightning and storm surge 
as the main effects responsible for damage to industrial installations. 
In the second part of the report, we perform an analysis of past storm-triggered Natech 
events. Using different sources of public information on technological incidents, this study: 
1. Analyses incident statistics; 
2. Reviews a number of “landmark” accidents; 
3. Discusses the lessons learned. 
From the analysis of past events, the report concludes that Natech events caused by storms 
are frequent and that their relative occurrence is increasing compared to the overall 
occurrence of technological incidents from other causes in the analysed databases. The 
largest losses were generally triggered by heavy rain and flooding, while the most frequent 
trigger was lightning. The study also highlighted the role of a loss of power supply in 
triggering an incident or hampering the mitigation of its consequences. 
The study presents lessons learned from the forensic analysis of past events and puts 
forward recommendations for future risk reduction for all storm effects. The most important 
lesson is that storm predictions based on past events are not sufficient to be well prepared 
for future events, in particular in the face of climate change. 
 
 
2 
1 Introduction 
Storms are responsible for a number of accidents at industrial installations each year, 
resulting in fatalities, injuries, pollution and economic losses. Natural hazard triggered 
technological (Natech) accidents are frequent in the wake of natural disasters, and they 
have repeatedly had significant and long-term social, environmental and economic impacts 
(e.g. Krausmann and Cruz, 2013; Girgin, 2011; Krausmann et al., 2010; Godoy, 2007). 
While awareness of this risk is growing, and national and international initiatives have been 
launched to better assess and manage this type risk, there are still significant gaps that 
have hampered the effective Natech risk management (Krausmann and Baranzini, 2012).  
In Europe, the “Seveso III” Directive 2012/18/EU1, which lays down rules for the 
prevention of major accidents which might result from certain industrial activities and the 
limitation of their consequences for human health and the environment, requires 
specifically the assessment of Natech risks. In support of the European Union Member 
States but also other international players, the European Commission’s Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) has been involved – for almost a decade now – in the development of methods 
for the analysis of the risks of Natech accidents. 
Like other natural hazards, storms may seriously affect the integrity of an industrial 
installation and lead to accident scenarios such as fires, explosions and the dispersion of 
chemicals in the environment. Some of the most iconic storm-triggered Natech events 
were recorded when hurricanes Katrina and Rita hit Texas, Mississippi and Louisiana in 
2005. The two storms caused extensive damage to both onshore and offshore oil and gas 
infrastructure and triggered a number of hydrocarbon spills responsible for environmental 
emergencies (Ruckart et al., 2008; Cruz and Krausmann, 2009; Santella et al., 2010) and 
enormous economic losses (Blake et al., 2011). More recently, during Hurricane Harvey, 
the US Coast Guard National Response Center filed 96 reports of spills of hazardous 
chemicals, crude oil and fossil fuels which contaminated the coast of the Gulf of Mexico, 
while 46 facilities in 13 counties reported to the authorities airborne emissions totalling 4.6 
million pounds (Griggs, 2017). 
Moreover, the global worsening of extreme weather and sea conditions poses a great threat 
to industrial operators. The climate in the Atlantic Ocean has changed and the strength of 
storms and cyclones has grown in recent years (Gulev and Hasse, 1999), suggesting that 
even worse extreme events might occur in the years to come due to climate change. 
Hewson and Neu (2015) give an overview of the most important assessments with climate 
models of the expected climatic changes in the extra-tropical Atlantic Ocean and their 
impacts on extreme weather events on the neighbouring seas.  
Despite efforts to reduce the occurrence of man-made disasters, incidents related to 
environmental triggers have been occurring continuously, some of which with dramatic 
consequences. This report analyses past incidents triggered by storms aiming to 
understand lessons as to why these events happened, what the accident mechanisms, 
vulnerabilities and criticalities of existing installations were, and how those events can be 
prevented. 
In section 2 of this report, the hazard posed by storms is described. In sections 3 and 4, 
incident datasets composed of events collected from the main industrial accident databases 
are analysed. In section 5, a set of iconic case studies are reviewed, highlighting the critical 
factors that led to past events. In section 6, the most vulnerable infrastructure components 
and the riskiest operations are identified, while causes and modes of failure are described. 
Lessons learned are summarized in section 7 and conclusion are drawn in section 8. 
This report will help the development of tailored accident scenarios that can be used in risk 
assessment to better understand Natech risks. In addition, this knowledge can help to 
                                           
1 Directive 2012/18/EU of the European parliament and of the Council of 4 July 2012 on the control of major 
accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 
96/82/EC Text with EEA relevance 
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improve design standards to improve the resistance of industrial installations to extreme 
meteorological events. 
A discussion involving design, operations, practice, maintenance and planning close this 
document aiming to improve safety at hazardous installations, strengthen the resilience of 
critical infrastructure, avoid future major losses and protect the environment from 
accidental pollution. 
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2 Storm categories and effects 
2.1 Types of storm 
Storms comprehend a large variety of phenomena that differ from each other by a number 
of factors, such as the geographic location and morphology of the territory. Meteorology 
classifies the study of weather phenomena on the basis of their scale. The synoptic scale 
is a horizontal length scale of the order of 1000 kilometres or more (XWS, 2016). The 
largest low-pressure systems, such as extratropical cyclones are on the synoptic scale. 
Warm-core storms such as tropical and subtropical cyclones also lie within the synoptic 
scale. The mesoscale studies weather systems smaller than synoptic-scale systems but 
larger than microscale (or storm-scale) cumulus systems (NSSL, 2018). The microscale is 
concerned with systems of the order of 1 km that last less than a day, with many localized 
effects2. 
Severe storms have historically affected Europe. For example, the Xynthia storm in 2010 
was the largest European coastal disaster of the last 50 years, with 47 people killed in 
France alone (Chadenas et al., 2014). The 1953 storm surge in the southern North Sea, 
which resulted in over 2,000 deaths and extensive flooding across The Netherlands, 
England, Belgium and Scotland, led to strengthened flood defences and the development 
of modern flood warning systems (Wadey et al., 2015). The impact of each storm is 
evaluated in different ways in different countries, often using local socio-economic impact 
criteria (e.g. loss of lives and damage to property).  
2.1.1 Tropical cyclones 
A tropical cyclone is a rotating storm system characterised by a low-pressure centre and 
a spiral arrangement, which forms over tropical or subtropical waters (NHC, 2018). It 
features strong winds and torrential rain. Depending on the region it occurs and its 
strength (wind speed), a tropical cyclone is referred to by different names, for example 
hurricane, typhoon, tropical storm, cyclonic storm, tropical depression, or simply cyclone 
(WMO, 2018). Tropical cyclones usually form over large bodies of warm water. They 
obtain their energy from the evaporation of water from the ocean surface, which then 
condenses into clouds and rain when moist air rises and cools (Evans, 2017). Tropical 
cyclones are typically between 100 and 2,000 km in diameter. 
Tropical cyclones are natural phenomena that have greatly contributed to the 
morphology of modern shorelines (Woodruff et al., 2013). On average, about 90 tropical 
cyclones occur worldwide per year, with the annual distribution of these events varying 
among the various tropical cyclone basins (Frank and Young, 2007). Only about 20% of 
tropical cyclones make landfall with the intensity of a hurricane, but coastal impacts by 
tropical cyclones are due largely to this important subset of storms (Weinkle et al., 
2012).  
Although tropical cyclone activity is low in the North Indian Ocean and the North Atlantic 
compared to the Pacific, the frequency of coastal flooding is much higher. Extreme 
flooding is prevalent mainly on low-gradient shores, including barrier and deltaic 
systems; these areas have often also attracted the development of dense population 
centres (Woodruff et al., 2013). In the regions they affect, tropical cyclones are often the 
most damaging storms and, therefore, of primary importance when assessing flood risk. 
Figure 1 shows hurricane tracks and landfall location points for storms that make landfall 
at hurricane intensity. 
 
                                           
2 Definition by the Glossary of meteorology available at: 
https://web.archive.org/web/20110606101802/http://amsglossary.allenpress.com/glossary/search?query=
micrometeorology 
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Figure 1. Hurricane tracks (dark lines) and landfall location points (red dots) for storms that make 
landfall with hurricane intensity 
 
Source: (Weinkle et al., 2012) ©Copyright 2012 AMS 
2.1.2 Windstorms 
Most European windstorms originate from extra-tropical cyclones (synoptic-scale low 
pressure systems) with very strong winds or violent gusts that are capable of producing 
devastating socioeconomic impacts. In order for cyclones to grow, a strong north-south 
temperature gradient is needed, and a strongly baroclinic atmosphere. During the months 
October to March the North Atlantic Ocean satisfies these conditions, allowing extra-tropical 
cyclones to form (cyclogenesis) which travel eastwards towards Europe (XWS, 2016). 
The path that these storms follow (storm track) tends to curve toward northern European 
countries (e.g. the Faroe Islands, Ireland, the UK, and Scandinavia). However, occasionally 
the storms can travel further southwards, affecting countries such as France, Portugal, and 
Spain. 
Windstorms are strong wind phenomena that give rise to "damage footprints" at the 
ground. Windstorms can lead to structural damage, power outages to millions of people, 
and closed transport networks, resulting in severe disruption and even loss of lives (Roberts 
et al., 2014). While larger-scale aspects of extra-tropical cyclones can be easily forecast, 
the occurrence, location, and severity of the local major wind damage, are not. Windstorms 
in Europe can be divided into three main categories, namely: the warm jet, the cold jet 
and the sting jet. These phenomena vary in terms of physical mechanisms, atmospheric 
structure, spatial extent, duration, severity level, predictability, and location relative to the 
cyclone and its fronts. The sting jet is the type that results in the highest level of damage, 
but it is also the rarest. Windstorms are a major problem for Atlantic and Central Europe 
(XWS, 2016; Roberts et al., 2014). 
2.1.3 Polar lows 
A polar low is a small-scalecyclones that is found over ocean areas poleward of the main 
polar front in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. In Europe, they frequently 
occur in the northern Norwegian Sea and at the Barents Sea and only occasionally in the 
north of United Kingdom (Mallet et al., 2013).Because of their hurricane-force winds and 
circular shapes with an eye in the centre, they are often referred to as Arctic hurricanes. 
These systems expire quickly and they usually exist for no more than a couple of days. 
They can produce high-speed surface winds, large-amplitude ocean waves and heavy snow 
precipitation (Mallet et al., 2013)  
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2.1.4 Medicanes  
High winds in Europe can also be a result of convective storms (e.g. tornadoes which are 
the most severe) and cyclones formed in the Mediterranean basin (XWS, 2016). Similar to 
tropical cyclones, Mediterranean cyclones (sometimes called “medicanes”) are rare 
meteorological phenomena observed in the Mediterranean Sea. Due to the dry nature of 
the Mediterranean region, formation of medicanes is infrequent, with only 100 recorded 
events between 1948 and 2014 (Reale and Atlas, 2001). According to recent studies 
conducted on global warming effects on the Mediterranean region, tropical-like cyclones 
are likely to happen with lower frequency in the next 100 years, yet with stronger intensity 
(Reale and Atlas, 2001). Even though these events are less violent than most of the tropical 
cyclones, the wind speed reaches hurricane strength.  
2.1.5 Thunderstorms 
A thunderstorm is a storm characterised by the presence of lightning and thunder. 
Thunderstorms occur in a type of cloud known as a cumulonimbus, a cumulus cloud, 
modelled in the shape of a tower by rising air masses. There are four types of 
thunderstorms: single-cell thunderstorms, multi-cell storms or clusters, squall lines, and 
supercells. Supercell thunderstorms are the strongest and most severe and can rotate as 
do cyclones (NSSL, 2018). Downburst winds, large hailstones, and flash flooding caused 
by heavy precipitation can wreak havoc on human settlements, technological systems and 
agriculture. Stronger thunderstorm cells are capable of producing tornadoes and 
waterspouts. Thunderstorms can form at any geographic location but most frequently 
within the mid-latitude, where warm, moist air from tropical latitudes collides with cooler 
air from polar latitudes (NSSL, 2018). 
2.2 Climate change 
Hewson and Neu (2015) give an overview of the most important assessments with climate 
models on the expected changes in European climate and their impacts on extreme 
weather events. In the current climate, the main hazard for Europe are severe winter 
storms, which are typically local effects of extratropical cyclones, while tropical cyclones 
rarely reach Europe. However, this situation can quickly change. According to Haarsma et 
al. (2013), both the number and the severity of hurricanes reaching Europe are expected 
to increase due to climate change. 
Sea climate is also expected to change. According to Kushnir et al. (1997), North Atlantic 
wave heights have increased in the past years. The same conclusion was drawn by Gulev 
and Hasse (1999), who also relate the increase of wave height with the increase of wind 
speed in the northern Atlantic. This raises concern regarding the possibility of storm 
intensity increase in the northern Atlantic region, in the near future. Furthermore, based 
on global warming scenarios, rougher wave conditions and higher sea levels should be 
expected (Debernard et al, 2002). 
2.3 Effects of storms 
2.3.1 Wind action  
Winds can exert strong forces on buildings and other structures. The study of storm 
outflows and their loading of structures is an important topic of modern wind engineering 
(Letchford et al., 2002; Solari, 2014). The methods currently used to determine wind 
actions on structures are still mostly based on the synoptic extra-tropical cyclone model 
(Zhang et al., 2018) introduced by Davenport (1961). 
In addition, wind can carry objects that can become very dangerous projectiles. In 
Germany, the Technical Rule TRAS 320 (TRAS 320, 2015) differentiates the types of 
missiles that are propelled by the wind. If parts of industrial installations or objects are 
detached or lifted by the wind and carried through the air, they are referred to as ‘airborne 
projectiles’. If objects slide or roll along the ground by the wind, they are referred to as 
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‘ground-level projectiles’. Collapsing parts of installations, trees, etc. are referred to as 
other ‘wind-induced projectiles’. 
Thunderstorms, hurricanes, and tornadoes often induce trees to fall due to high wind 
forces. In addition to the direct threat to humans, fallen trees and branches may interfere 
with overhead power lines and cause also prolonged power outages which, in turn, may 
result in loss of services from a number of critical infrastructure systems (Kabir et al., 
2018). 
Wind can endanger technological systems housing hazardous substances in the following 
situations (TRAS 320, 2015): 
1. When the stability and/or integrity of safety-relevant parts of sites and installations 
where particular substances are present is immediately threatened. 
2. When the functioning of safety-relevant parts of sites and installations is threatened. 
3. When safety-relevant operating procedures or work processes cannot be carried out or 
only carried out under more difficult conditions. 
2.3.2 Heavy precipitation 
Storm activity may produce intense rainfall, potentially resulting in flash floods, mudslides, 
and landslides. Water can cause damage to the power grid and to electrical equipment, 
disrupting businesses and critical infrastructure. Buoyancy can float and displace lighter 
objects in flooded areas. Heavy rain or snow accumulating on structures can cause failure 
due to weight loading. Numerous floating roof storage tanks were damaged by heavy rain 
accumulation during hurricane Harvey in 2017, allowing the release of their content of 
hazardous material (Blum, 2017)). 
2.3.3 Storm surge 
Storm surge is associated with either tropical or extra-tropical storms. This includes effects 
driven by wind, pressure and waves, but not the effects of tides or wave run-up (Wu et 
al., 2018). Storm surge can flood large areas and cause water damage. Storm surge and 
heavy rain both contribute to the flooding of coastal areas, especially in low floodplains 
and river deltas. 
2.3.4 Lightning 
The impact of lightning strikes can trigger different accident scenarios, depending on the 
features of the industrial equipment and on the properties of the stored hazardous 
substance. The direct action of lightning impact on metal enclosures may result in the 
damage of the shell or pipe (puncturing) and in the subsequent release of liquid (Necci et 
al., 2013). When flammable substances are contained, direct and indirect lightning strikes 
may cause fires and/or confined explosions, even in the absence of direct damage to the 
tank shell (Necci et al., 2014). 
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3 Natech Statistics 
3.1 Data sources 
The data sources for the present analysis were the European industrial incident databases 
ARIA (BARPI, 2018a), MHIDAS (HSE, 2007), TAD (ICheme, 2004) eMARS (eMARS, 2018) 
and FACTS (FACTS, 2018). The ARIA database is publicly accessible, while access to FACTS 
requires a licence. The eMARS database contains confidential information on major 
accidents submitted to the European Commission by the Competent Authorities. The 
MHIDAS and TAD databases are no longer supported. 
The ARIA database (Analyse, Recherche et Information sur les Accidents) is managed by 
the French Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development (BARPI, 2018a). This 
database contains records involving accidents in industrial plants or storage farms as well 
as “near misses” which may compromise health, public safety, and the environment. BARPI 
prepared a detailed report on Natech accidents (BARPI, 2013), which was used as a source 
of information for the current report. 
The FACTS database (Failure and ACcidents Technical information System) is managed by 
TNO Industrial and External Safety Department, and contains information on events which 
caused (accidents) or could cause (near misses) severe consequences (FACTS, 2018). 
Although FACTS requires a licence to access the report of the incidents, some summary 
information about the incidents is available for free. This summary information include: 
year, country, type of activity, location, list of chemicals involved, generic cause, and the 
occurrence of deaths and injuries. In addition each incident has a number of keyword-tags 
that can be used to obtain additional information and to filter search results (Campedel, 
2008). 
MHIDAS (Major Hazard Incident DAta Service) was a database managed by AEA 
Technology Ltd. (Warrington, UK) on behalf of the British Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE, 2007). The MHIDAS database is no longer in service. For this reason, the dataset 
we collected from this source is outdated to the date of our last licence purchase in 2007. 
Nevertheless, the database contains information on more than 7000 incidents that 
occurred in industrial sites and during the transport of hazardous materials that actually or 
potentially had off-site impact (Campedel, 2008). 
The IChemE database (TAD) is a product of the Institution of the Chemical Engineers 
(IChemE), an international professional membership organization that promotes research 
activities and knowledge development in all the sectors of chemical engineering, including 
process safety (Campedel, 2008). The IChemE database contains data from different 
sources, including the “Loss Prevention Bulletin” and reports of the US Chemical Safety 
and Hazard Investigation Board. The information stored in the records of the database is 
often very concise and usually limited details are reported on the installation where the 
incident took place and on release mechanism and path (Campedel, 2008). 
The Major Accident Reporting System (MARS and later renamed eMARS after going online) 
was first established by the EU’s Seveso Directive 82/501/EEC in 1982 and has remained 
in place with subsequent revision of the Seveso Directive in effect today.  eMARS contains 
reports of chemical accidents and near misses provided to the Major Accident Hazards 
Bureau (MAHB) of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC) from EU, EEA, 
OECD, and UNECE countries (under the TEIA Convention).  Reporting an event into eMARS 
is compulsory for EU Member States when a Seveso establishment is involved in an 
accident and the event meets the consequence criteria of a “major accident” as defined by 
Annex VI of the Seveso III Directive. For non-EU OECD and UNECE countries, reporting 
accidents to the eMARS database is voluntary. The information of the reported event is 
entered into eMARS directly by the official reporting authority of the country in which the 
event occurred. 
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3.2 Method used 
For the data extraction, selection criteria were defined in agreement with the following 
rules: 
 The loss of containment of a hazardous substance occurred or could have occurred. 
 An industrial activity processing or storing hazardous substances was involved. 
 The event generated (or had the potential to generate) an accident scenario with 
off-site consequences (major accident). 
In the analysis of industrial sites, we included mainly activities falling under the provisions 
of the European Seveso III Directive and similar legislation outside Europe. However, the 
databases include also incidents in other industrial sites not covered by these types of legal 
frameworks, which were also considered in the present study for lessons learning purposes. 
Although of general interest, incidents at offshore oil and gas operations, transport by 
vessel, by train and by truck and pipelines are beyond the scope of this study and were 
therefore excluded from the analysis.  
During the data selection process only incidents with an obvious role of natural events as 
a main event trigger were included in the analysis as Natech incidents. In order to identify 
these events, the data set was filtered according to the following steps: 
- Analysis of incidents tags or keywords based on cause. When the tag or keyword referred 
to natural causes or to one specific natural event (e.g. lightning, flood, earthquake) the 
incidents was added. 
- Analysis of incidents description or summary. When the summary texts include references 
to natural causes or to one specific natural event (e.g. lightning, flood, earthquake) the 
incidents was added. 
Among these, storm-triggered Natech incidents were filtered out and further analysed. 
When possible, the categories available in the databases were used to filter the results. 
When such information was not available, a keyword-based selection with manual 
verification was performed. 
For the purpose of this study we use the following definitions: 
An incident is an event resulting in unwanted consequences, including near misses and 
accidents. An accident is an incident which results in serious consequences and possibly 
creates an emergency situation. 
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4 Results 
4.1 Analysis of Natech events 
Table 1 summarizes the number of Natech incidents recorded in each database. The table 
contains three different categories, depending on the type of operation, which are: 
“Transport vehicles” (i.e. train, truck or vessel), “Pipelines” and “Fixed installations”. This 
is important since the mechanisms that can trigger a Natech accident can be completely 
different for industrial installations or for transport, such as a truck accident. For this 
reason, the analysis of Natech incidents regards fixed installations only, and in the 
statistics, the other events were excluded.  
Table 1. Number of Natech events in each database 
Database 
name 
Total 
Natech 
Transport 
vehicles 
Pipelines Fixed 
installations 
MHIDAS 705 359 93 254 
FACTS 962 137 136 689 
eMARS 33 0 0 33 
ARIA 920 N.A.3 N.A. N.A. 
TAD 560 185 39 336 
Source: JRC 
In order to identify Natech incidents due to storms the natural event that triggered the 
incident should be analysed. For the databases MHIDAS, ARIA, TAD and eMARS it was 
possible to identify one major natural hazard that triggered the Natech, by looking at the 
incident description (or abstract). Table 2 shows the relative occurrence of Natech incidents 
according to natural causes for the databases: MHIDAS, FACTS, ARIA, TAD and eMARS. 
For the database FACTS, the full report of the incidents was not available, and keywords 
were used to identify the natural hazards. However, many records list multiple natural 
hazards. In the absence of a detailed incident description to which we had no access, it 
was not possible to identify the triggering natural hazards among those listed. Therefore, 
Table 2 reports only the occurrence of each keyword. It should be noted that none of the 
keywords in FACTS refers to storms explicitly.  
Results for the databases are not uniform, possibly due to geographical differences in the 
data source. The tags for natural events were sometimes very specific. For this reason, 
they were grouped in larger harmonized categories, namely: Freeze, Landslide/erosion, 
Wind/storm, Lightning, Flooding, Temperature, Heavy rain, Earthquake, and Snow. Figure 
2 shows the distribution of Natech incidents per natural hazard and database. MHIDAS and 
TAD, which have a global coverage on incident reporting, have a similar distribution of 
incidents among the same natural event triggers. In fact, for both lightning has the biggest 
share of records, while records labelled under Temperature (or Freeze) takes the second 
place. These categories were followed by other atmospheric phenomena: Flooding, 
Wind/storm and Heavy rain, while the least frequent categories were Earthquake and 
Landslide. The main difference between the two databases is the size of the category Other, 
which is much bigger for TAD, due to the presence of numerous events under the label 
Weather effects (including additional events due to heavy rain and temperature). 
 
                                           
3 Not Available 
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Table 2. Number of records per each tag or keyword  
TAD MHIDAS eMARS 
Avalanche 1 Earthquake 13 Flood 4 
Cold weather 43 Floods 34 Freeze 9 
Earth movement 2 Ground 3 Heavy rain 1 
Earth tremor 2 High winds 18 High Temperature 3 
Earthquake 16 Lightning 141 Lightning 7 
Flood 7 Other 2 Other 1 
Fog 1 Temperature 43 Storm 8 
Freezing 9 ARIA FACTS 
Hot weather 5 Earthquake 28 Earthquake 30 
Lightning 126 Extreme temperature 98 Erosion 59 
Rain 10 Flooding 157 Flooding 41 
Settlement 1 Frost 67 Ground subsidence 90 
Storm damage 3 Heavy rain 269 Lightning 161 
Subsidence 2 Landslide/Erosion 19 Natural event 451 
Sunlight 3 Lightning 186 Solidify/Icing 143 
Thermal expansion 12 Snow 31 Subside/Sinking 164 
Typhoon 24 Wind/Storm 65   
Weather effects 23     
Source: JRC 
eMARS has a lower number of records and a prevalence of European incidents. The biggest 
category is Freeze, and together with Temperature they exceed one third of the set’s size. 
Wind/storm follows and Lightning takes the third place. Heavy rain and Flood have a low 
impact with only 15% of the set share combined. None of these accidents was triggered 
by Earthquake or Landslide. 
ARIA has a big set of Natech incidents (920 records), but they are reported mainly from 
France (747). For this dataset, the main hazards are Heavy rain and Flood which account 
for almost half of the set’s records combined. Lightning is the second hazard, and 
Temperature and Freeze follow. Wind/storms, Earthquake and Landslide/erosion are the 
categories with the lowest number of records. 
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Figure 2. Pie charts describing the distribution of Natech incidents by triggering natural event for 
the databases: MHIDAS, ARIA, TAD and eMARS 
 
Source: JRC 
4.2 Analysis of storm-triggered Natech events 
In order to describe storm-triggered Natech events, records of storm-triggered events 
were collected in a separate subset. All incidents that refer to storms or hurricanes were 
included, as well as all incidents that contain one or more effects of storms (see section 
2.2). Table 3 shows the number of storm-related Natech incidents for the databases 
analysed. 
Table 3. Number and ratio of storm-triggered Natech events for the database considered. 
MHIDAS 192 (76.0%) 
ARIA 677 (73.6%) 
eMARS 20 (60.6%) 
TAD 192 (57.4%) 
 
This following sections provide a deeper analysis of storm-triggered incidents for the 
databases MHIDAS and TAD.  
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4.2.1 Storm-triggered Natech events in TAD 
Figure 3 shows the trend of storm-triggered incidents in the TAD database (blue bars) and 
compares this trend with the record trend for all the incidents in the database (red line). 
The overall number of records is continuously increasing (possibly due to an increase in 
the number of industrial activities as well as the chances for reporting incidents) except for 
the late 90s, where the trend is decreasing. At the same time however, the number of 
storm-triggered incidents also increases up to the 80’s and then remains almost steady. 
The relative increase of the number of storm-triggered Natechs compared to other 
incidents could reflect the fact that new safety requirements effectively mitigated the risk 
due to conventional technological accidents, but failed to reduce the risk posed by storm-
triggered Natech events. However, we cannot be certain due to fragmentation of the data 
source itself. In addition, this data represents the information available in the database 
and not the total number of incidents in the period, which causes uncertainties in the 
assessment. 
Figure 3. Number of storm-triggered Natech events (blue bars) and total number of technological 
incidents (orange line) collected since 1960 and grouped in 5 year periods for the TAD database 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 4 shows the distribution of storm-triggered incidents with respect to the type of 
equipment or structure that was involved or damaged. Storage facilities were most 
frequently hit by storms, showing not only a vulnerability to these events, but also a 
potential for major accidents due to the large storage volume. Process equipment follows 
with less than half the records compared to storage. Other interesting categories are 
electrical equipment, building and structures, safety equipment and instrumentation, each 
with ten or less records.  
The number of incidents due to lightning strikes overshadows the other storm effects, 
which have a very small statistical significance. It is thus necessary to analyse Natech 
incidents separately, on the basis of the natural effect that triggered the incident. Figure 5 
shows the distribution of storm-triggered Natech events that were caused by lightning 
strikes. The results are similar to that of the whole dataset, except that lightning strikes 
have a higher relative impact on storage equipment and a lower impact on process 
equipment, if compared to the distribution of the entire set (Figure 4). 
Conversely, Figure 6 shows the distribution of storm-triggered Natech events that were 
caused by all effects except lightning divided by the type of equipment affected. Also in 
this case the results are similar to that of the whole dataset, except that the categories 
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process equipment and building or structure have a higher relative occurrence if compared 
to distribution of the entire set (Figure 4), while storage has a lower occurrence. 
Figure 4. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (all storm effects) 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 5. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (lightning 
triggered incidents only) 
 
Source: JRC  
Going more into the details of the single causes, Figure 7 shows the distribution of storm-
triggered Natech events due to rain or flood. These also show a similar distribution of that 
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depicted in Figure 4, but with a larger relative occurrence of the categories building or 
structure, instrumentation and blank (no information) and a slightly lower occurrence of 
storage and process equipment. The label blank usually refers to damage to the factory as 
a whole, which is a very common scenario when the industrial site gets flooded.  
Figure 6. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (lightning 
triggered incidents excluded) 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 7. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (only incidents 
triggered by rain and flood) 
 
Source: JRC 
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Figure 8. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (only incidents 
triggered by wind) 
 
Source: JRC  
Finally, Figure 8 shows the distribution of Natech events triggered by the effects of wind 
and based on the type of affected equipment. Wind-induced incidents have a completely 
different trend compared to that of the whole TAD data set. Process equipment is in this 
case the tag with the highest relative occurrence, followed closely by storage. All other 
categories have marginal relative occurrence, and the label electrical does not appear at 
all in case of wind-triggered incidents. 
Another important parameter to describe storm-triggered Natech events is the 
consequence of the incident. We created a list of consequence categories, each describing 
a different scenario. A category was assigned to each event, using the same categories as 
the database. The list of labels used is as follows: Blow-out, Collapse, Damage to 
equipment, Evacuation, Explosion, Explosion and fire, Fatality, Fire, Gas/Vapour release, 
Near miss, Plant shutdown, Spill (liquid) and Vapour Cloud Explosion (VCE). 
Figure 9 shows the distribution of storm-triggered Natech events as a function of the 
consequences that resulted from the event. Each colour represents a different natural 
action that triggered the incident, as for the labels used by TAD. The most common events 
are those filed under the Fire and Explosion and fire tags. In fact, these accidents where 
mostly the result of lightning strikes hitting chemical facilities and in particular oil refineries 
and tank terminals. Damage to equipment is the second most frequent category and was 
caused mainly by Typhoons, Weather effects and Flood. Spills are mainly caused by Rain, 
Flood or generic Weather effects. Since the results of Figure 9 suggest that each natural 
hazard produces different scenarios, each triggering effect was analysed separately. For 
this reason the labels that were too generic (i.e. Typhoon and Weather effects) were further 
analysed to understand whether the incident was due to wind, rain, lightning or flood 
action. 
 
 
17 
Figure 9. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech incidents by consequence. The specific storm 
effects that triggered the events are identified with different colours 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 10 shows the distribution of lightning-triggered Natech events, sorted by the type 
of consequence. Fire, Explosion and Explosion and fire together sum up to over 80% of all 
lightning-triggered events. Among the remaining scenarios, Damage to equipment is the 
most numerically relevant. It should be noted that lightning is the only natural hazard that 
triggered Vapour cloud explosion and Blowout scenarios. 
In Figure 11 the distribution of consequences for Natech events triggered by the effect of 
rain or flood due to a storm is shown. The consequence types are well distributed, but the 
category with the highest relative occurrence is Spill (29%). Actually, rain and flood are 
the only types of natural hazard that feature this scenario. In this case, the categories Fire, 
Explosion and Explosion and fire have also a high relative occurrence, summing up to 40% 
of the Natech events triggered by rain and flood. Other relevant scenarios are Damage to 
equipment and Gas/vapour release. 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of the consequence of wind-triggered Natech events. In 
this case Damage to equipment and Fire have the highest relative occurrence, with over 
one half (53%) of the wind-triggered incidents set, followed by Collapse. Explosion and fire 
has a lower occurrence, if compared to the previous natural hazards with 8%. Other 
scenarios are Gas/vapour release and Near miss. 
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Figure 10. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech incidents by consequence (only incidents 
triggered by lightning) 
 
Source: JRC 
 
Figure 11. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech incidents by consequence (only incidents 
triggered by heavy rain or flooding) 
 
Source: JRC 
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Figure 12. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech incidents by consequence (only incidents 
triggered by wind) 
 
Source: JRC 
4.2.2 Storm-triggered Natech events in MHIDAS 
Similar to Figure 3 for TAD, Figure 13 shows the trend (in 5-years increments) of storm-
triggered incidents in the MHIDAS database (blue bars) in comparison with the trend of all 
technological incidents in MHIDAS (red line). The overall number of records is continuously 
increasing (possibly due to an increase in the number of industrial activities as well as the 
requirements for reporting, or data availability). At the same time the number of storm-
triggered events also increases, possibly at a higher rate than the red line.  
Figure 13. Number of storm-triggered Natech events (blue bars) and the overall number of 
records in the MHIDAS database (orange line), since 1960 and every in 5-years increments 
 
Source: JRC 
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Figure 14. Ratio of the number of storm-triggered Natech events and the overall number of 
records in the MHIDAS database, since 1960 and every in 5-years increments  
 
Source: JRC 
To better appreciate the relative trend of storm-triggered Natechs compared with the 
overall database, Figure 14 reports the trend (in 5-years increments) of the numerical 
value of the ratio between storm-triggered Natechs and the overall records. The graph 
shows an initial reduction of the ratio of storm-triggered Natechs, but then a sudden 
increase, starting from the late 90s. Similar to what was observed for TAD in Section 4.2.1, 
the relative increase of the number of storm-triggered Natech event compared to other 
incidents could indicate that new safety requirements effectively mitigated the risk due to 
conventional technological accidents, while failing to reduce the risk posed by storm-
triggered Natech events. 
The focus of MHIDAS is on the actual technological accidents with hazardous-substance 
releases, thus damage to structures or to auxiliary equipment that did not result in an 
accident was not reported. For this reason, in MHIDAS only three categories that describe 
the affected type of equipment or structure were identified: electrical equipment, process 
equipment and storage. Figure 15 shows the distribution of storm-triggered accidents with 
respect to the type of equipment or structure that was involved or damaged. Storage 
facilities were the most frequently hit by storm events (84%). Process equipment follows 
with only 15% relative occurrence. Electrical equipment has only one record.  
We decided to analyse Natech accidents separately, on the basis of the natural effect that 
triggered the event. In all the cases analysed, the majority of equipment affected was 
storage, followed by process equipment. Still, for specific natural hazards there are 
variations that require some considerations.  
Figure 16 shows the distribution of storm-triggered Natech events that were triggered by 
lightning strikes. The results are similar to that of the whole dataset, except that lightning 
strikes had a higher relative impact on storage equipment and a lower impact on process 
equipment, if compared to the distribution of the entire set (Figure 15). Figure 17 shows 
the distribution of storm-triggered Natech events that were triggered by all effects except 
lightning. In this case, the category process equipment has a higher relative occurrence if 
compared to the distribution of the entire set (Figure 15), while storage has a lower 
occurrence. 
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 Figure 15. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of equipment or structure 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 16. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of equipment or structure 
(lightning triggered accidents only) 
 
Source: JRC  
The results for accidents caused by heavy rain or floods (Figure 18) show that the 
percentage of records in which storage equipment was damaged is slightly higher 
compared to the distribution of the entire set of storm-triggered Natech events. Figure 19 
shows the distribution of storm-triggered Natech events that are caused by wind. In this 
case, the category process equipment has much higher relative occurrence (39%) by 
comparison with the distribution of the entire set (Figure 15) with a value that is more than 
twice as high. 
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Figure 17. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (lightning 
triggered accident excluded) 
 
Source: JRC 
 
Figure 18. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (only accidents 
triggered by rain and flood) 
 
Source: JRC 
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Figure 19. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of structure (only accidents 
triggered by wind) 
 
Source: JRC  
Figure 20 shows the distribution of storm-triggered Natech events by the type of 
consequences that followed. Each colour represents a different natural action that triggered 
the accident, as for the labels used by MHIDAS. 
The most common consequences were Fire and Explosion and Fire. In fact, these accidents 
where mostly due to lightning strikes at chemical facilities and in particular oil refineries 
and tank terminals. Spills are the second most important consequence category and they 
were mainly caused by rain, flood or generic weather effects.  
Since the results of Figure 20 suggest that each natural hazard produces different 
scenarios, each triggering effect was analysed separately. Figure 21 shows the distribution 
of lightning-triggered Natech events, sorted by the type of consequence. Fire, Explosion, 
and Explosion and fire are the three main categories, which together sum up to over 90% 
of all lightning-triggered events. A small percentage of releases were also recorded (2%). 
Figures 22 and 23 show the distribution of consequences for Natech events triggered by 
the effect of rain or flood and the effect of wind, respectively. In both images, the category 
with the highest relative occurrence is Release/Spill (about 70% for both). Fire, Explosion, 
and Explosion and fire have a lower occurrence, if compared to lightning-triggered Natechs, 
and sum up to 24% and 28% of rain/ flood-triggered and wind-triggered Natechs, 
respectively. The scenario Gas/vapour release was only observed for rain or flood-triggered 
Natechs. 
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Figure 20. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech accidents by consequence. The specific storm 
effects that triggered the accidents are identified with different colours 
 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 21. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech accidents by consequence (only accidents 
triggered by lightning) 
 
Source: JRC 
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Figure 22. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech accidents by consequence (only accidents 
triggered by heavy rain or flooding) 
 
Source: JRC 
Figure 23. Distribution of storm-triggered Natech accidents by consequence (only accidents 
triggered by wind) 
 
Source: JRC 
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4.2.3 Results summary 
From the analysis of the incidents in TAD and MHIDAS it is possible to conclude that: 
 Storage equipment is the most vulnerable to storm damage (see Figure 15); 
 Fires and explosions are the most common scenarios (see Figure 20); 
 Lightning has the highest number of records and the highest relative number of 
major accidents recorded (over 80% of lightning-triggered accidents are fires or 
explosions) (see Figure 21); 
 Rain and flood have also a very high relative occurrence of major accidents (75% 
are either fires or releases of hazardous substances) and if compared to other 
hazards they have the highest potential for environmental damage due to the high 
occurrence of spills (see Figure 22); 
 The effect of wind is the least probable to trigger Natech accidents. Even when wind 
does cause damage to equipment, it is more likely to be process equipment (and in 
particular tall structures), which has a lower holding capacity compared to storage 
equipment and thus less potential for a major accident (see Figure 19). 
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5 Analysis of accident case studies  
5.1 Hurricane Hugo, Virgin Islands, 1989 
Hurricane Hugo reached category 5 intensity on September 15, 1989. The storm intensity 
decreased to category 4 when it crossed the Lesser Antilles, making landfall in Guadeloupe, 
with sustained winds of 140 mph (225 km/h) and a storm surge of 12 ft (3.7 m), causing 
severe damage to the island. Then, the storm continued moving West over the island of 
Monserrat, the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, where it made landfall with winds of up 
to 130 mph at 7am on September 18. The storm then made landfall near Charleston, South 
Carolina, on September 21, 1989, becoming the costliest storm in US history at the time 
with 7 billion dollars in damage (Bills and Whiting, 1991F). 
This hurricane carried sustained winds of over 140 mph and created a storm surge as high 
as 3.6 m as it came ashore on the south side of St. Croix, United States Virgin Islands 
(Bills and Whiting, 1991). The hurricane triggered a major oil spill at the Virgin Islands 
Water and Power Authority (VI WAPA) facility in Christiansted, St. Croix. It destroyed the 
containment wall around a 54,000-barrel storage tank filled with No. 6 fuel oil, and severed 
a discharge line at the bottom of the tank when the wall fell on the pipe (Bills and Whiting, 
1991). Fuel oil leaked from the tank at an estimated rate of 1,750 barrels per day, onto 
the facility grounds. An open valve had permitted the oil to escape through the broken pipe 
(NOAA, 2018). Oil then overflowed the containment dike and began to leak through the 
trenches. A total of 14,076 barrels escaped from this tank between September 18 and 25. 
More than 1,000 barrels overflowed the containment area and entered the water. Because 
of the spill, three miles of sand beaches were heavily polluted. The contaminated beaches 
consisted mostly of fine-grained sands. Over 400 beach clean-up workers were hired and 
trained to perform manual removal of oiled sands. A total of 30,000 cubic meter of polluted 
sand was removed. Recontamination of previously cleaned beaches during high tides 
required repetitive removals for several weeks. The beaches were declared substantially 
clean after 60 days of continuous decontamination (Curl et al., 1992). 
On the south coast of St. Croix, the hurricane destroyed five large oil storage tanks (Figure 
24) and damaged several others at the Hess Oil Virgin Islands Corporation (HOVIC) 
refinery. Oil spilled but was contained on the facility grounds, within containment bunds 
with earthen dykes. Only a small portion of the oil reached the HOVIC tanker harbour. 
However, the oil remained within the narrow harbour limits, pressed against the shoreline, 
by wind and wave action. The damaged storage tanks at HOVIC spilled some 10,000 barrels 
of oil (Figure 25). A harbour boom had been deployed from the end of the pier to the 
shoreline, allowing the containment of most of the oil (Bills and Whiting, 1991).  
Due to the destruction from hurricane Hugo, all agencies were lacking vital communication 
facilities. Normal modes of communication did not exist. Therefore, mobile satellite 
communications were critical to the success of the response. Other parts of the island's 
infrastructure, such as potable water, electricity, and sanitation facilities, were also 
destroyed by the hurricane and hampered response efforts. Pollution responders overcame 
the lack of power, water, food, lodging, communications, and transportation to perform an 
effective clean-up of these spills (Bills and Whiting, 1991). 
The events in St. Croix showed that worst-case scenarios may be exceeded by 
unimaginable catastrophic events. A 1.5-million-barrel catastrophic tanker grounding, 
originally postulated as the worst oil spill imaginable in St. Croix, was replaced by a 14-
million-barrel catastrophic destruction of the HOVIC tank farm (Bills and Whiting, 1991). 
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Figure 24. Damage by Hugo to oil tanks in St. Croix 
 
Source: National Archives catalog 
Figure 25. An oil slick pollutes the water off the coast of St. Croix after oil leaked from storage 
tanks damaged during hurricane Hugo 
  
Source: National Archives catalog  
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5.2 Hurricane Katrina, USA, 2005 
Katrina made its first landfall in the United States as a Category 1 hurricane near the border 
of Miami-Dade County and Broward County in Florida and spent only about six hours over 
land. The storm then made landfall in Louisiana on August 29, 2005. As the centre of the 
eye made its closest approach to the east of downtown New Orleans, the hurricane was 
downgraded to a Category 3 (Davis, 2006). 
The impact of hurricane Katerina on the US coast was the costliest natural disaster in US 
history. It triggered a large number of spills of petroleum products and chemicals in Texas, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida. Hurricane Katrina resulted in over 200 onshore 
releases of hazardous chemicals, petroleum, or natural gas. In addition, there were over 
800 releases of these materials from offshore platforms, vessels, and pipelines in the Gulf 
of Mexico where Katrina had category 5 severity (Cruz and Krausmann, 2009). The region 
impacted by hurricane Katrina has a long history of hurricane impacts. Many facilities 
severely affected by hurricane Katrina had been operating for decades and were aware of 
the risks posed by hurricanes (Santella et al., 2010). 
The releases of petroleum products caused by hurricane Katrina were extraordinarily large 
(Figure 26). There were at least 10 onshore releases greater than 10,000 gallons (38 m3) 
each. In sum, these 10 releases totalled approximately 8 million gallons (30,000 m3). 
Failures of storage tanks were a major cause of petroleum releases. Indeed, large releases 
were generally of crude oil that leaked from storage tanks damaged by storm surge. 
Catchment basins, which offer secondary containment around the tanks, were flooded, 
allowing the oil to spread into surrounding areas. These sites were only accessible by boat 
until the flood waters receded, and much of the oil had been lost before containment and 
recovery operations started. (Santella et al., 2010). 
Figure 26. Large oil spill reaches a residential area floating on floodwaters 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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Santella et al., (2010) carried out an analysis of 1,070 releases attributed to hurricane 
Katrina between 2005 and 2008. The majority of releases were petroleum (76%) with 
some chemicals (18%) and natural gas (6%). Damage to above ground oil storage tanks 
from hurricane Katrina occurred due to wind pressures in facilities that were along the path 
of the hurricane, but most of the damage and the most significant consequences occurred 
due to flooding during the days after the hurricane (Godoy, 2007). On the other hand, 
damage due to hurricane Rita a month later, occurred almost exclusively due to direct wind 
action. In addition, a majority of records (64%) showed releases at storage tanks. 
Nine refineries in the area were shut down completely and four refineries reduced 
operations before the hurricane. Ruckart et al. (2008) observed that a large percentage 
(72%) of events reported to the Hazardous Substances Emergency Events Surveillance 
System (HSEES) were related to system shutdown or startup. Many releases of chemicals 
occurred in the form of orphaned containers, the discoveries of which were only 
occasionally recorded. 
Spill response was inhibited by the fact that many responders were themselves displaced 
or otherwise impacted by the hurricane. Displacement of workers due to evacuation, home 
loss, and gasoline shortages reduced available manpower and disrupted their operations. 
Loss of communication systems was another hindrance, as well as the difficulty in acquiring 
supplies and contractors for reconstruction or operation (Santella et al., 2010). 
5.2.1 Murphy Oil spill 
The oil spill from Murphy Oil refinery in St. Bernard Parish (Meraux) was the most 
significant spill that followed hurricane Katrina. The refinery was inundated with 12 feet of 
water by the storm surge. A 250,000-barrel above ground storage tank, only partially filled 
with mixed crude oil floated and ruptured (Figure 27). The 25,110 barrels of crude oil 
spilled from Murphy's refinery flooded an area of about a square mile that contained 
approximately 1,800 houses. Twenty-six different class action lawsuits were filed against 
the company (NOAA, 2018). 
Figure 27. Displaced and damaged oil storage tank at Murphy oil 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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5.2.2 Dynegy 
At the Dynegy plant in Venice two tanks failed due to the hurricane and light crude oil was 
discharged near the main channel leading into the Gulf. The oil was contained in the berm, 
with 3 inches of freeboard. Recovery was hampered by the presence of masses of roseau 
cane (Figure 28), deposited by the storm surge, which covered the facility under a coat of 
dead vegetation (NOAA, 2018). 
Figure 28. Local vegetation deposited at the facility by the storm surge hampers oil recovery 
operations 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
5.2.3 Shell Pilot Town 
At Shell Pilot Town facility, an oil spill was caused by a microwave tower that fell and 
pierced a storage tank. Another tank had floated and was displaced due to the storm surge. 
A pipe was bent and severed as the tank moved. The spills occurred within the containment 
bund of the facility, but the hurricane dispersed most of the oil (Figure 29). The oil-water 
mixture in the retention area was collected in tanks and decanted. Approximately 22,685 
barrels were recovered (NOAA, 2018).  
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Figure 29. Damage to oil terminal due to storm surge: a) aerial view of the facility showing a 
displaced tank; b) details of the damage sustained by two storage tanks; c) close view of a 
detached line and operators recovering the spilled oil. 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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5.2.4 Shell Nairn 
One of the biggest releases during hurricane Katrina was an oil spill from a pipeline at Shell 
Nairn Pipeline Company in Port Sulphur, Louisiana. The 20-inch diameter pipeline, 
supported by a berm, ruptured with a 2-inch by 6-inch hole. The Shell Nairn facility was 
extensively flooded and amount of oil was released into a nearby marsh where it created 
a sheen with a length of 5 to 6 miles (Figure 30 and 31). With its 139,000 gallons of oil 
released, this was the major onshore pipeline releases that followed Katrina impact 
(Santella et al., 2010). This flooded area is adjacent to the Mississippi River, and lower in 
elevation than both the river and sea (NOAA, 2018). 
Figure 30. Example of a flooded catchment basin at Shell Nairn following hurricane Katrina 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
Figure 31. Marsh contaminated by oil near Port Sulfur 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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5.2.5 Sundown Energy 
The storm surge caused by hurricane Katrina ruptured two tanks and piping at Sundown 
East and West facilities causing a spill of 450 and 320 barrels of oil, respectively. The sites 
are located at Potash in a very remote location along the banks of the Mississippi, where 
access was very difficult (NOAA, 2018). Floating vessels that were carried by hurricane 
Katrina's storm surge impacted the facilities and contributed to the damage.  (Figure 32). 
Figure 32. Flooded retention area around oil storage tanks at the Sundown Energy east facility on 
the Mississippi River.  
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
5.2.6 Bass Enterprises 
Oil spilled at Bass Enterprises in Cox Bay from two storage tanks. Each tank was 16 ft (5m) 
high and 290 ft (88 m) in diameter (Figure 33). About 90,000 barrels of crude oil were 
released, with 10,000 barrels remaining in the tanks. Roughly half of the oil was contained 
in the berm, and another 25% was recovered, but a significant amount of oil either 
evaporated or reached the river and the adjacent marsh. Additionally, a second large oil 
spill of about 460,000 gallons (1700 m3) occurred at another Bass Enterprises facility in 
Point a la Hache (NOAA, 2018). 
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Figure 33. Aerial view of crude oil spill into the Mississippi River coming from two damaged 
storage tanks of Bass Enterprises in Cox Bay. 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
5.2.7  Chevron Empire 
At the Chevron Empire terminal, storage tanks were so heavily damaged that their contents 
were dispersed before response teams could reach the site (Santella et al., 2010). 
Approximately 24,000 barrels of crude oil were released from the damaged tanks (NOAA, 
2018). One of the tanks was almost completely destroyed by the force of the storm (Figure 
34). 
Figure 34. Close-up picture of a heavily damaged tank at Chevron Empire. 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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5.3 Hurricane Rita, USA, 2005 
Several facilities suffered intense wind damage to storage tanks and to some process 
equipment. The wind caused buckling, bending and even overturning of storage tanks. 
Storage tanks with the lowest inventory showed the highest vulnerability to wind damage.  
Many small storage tanks were dislodged and carried by the storm surge, and some were 
found up to 10 miles inland (NOAA, 2018). A diesel tank stranded in the Texas Point Wildlife 
Refuge landed right side up showing evidence of leaking (Figure 35). The amount of 
product lost during the storm is unknown. 
An alkali and chlorine manufacturing plant released 1082 pounds of toxic chlorine when a 
power failure caused excess pressure in the chlorine tank. Operators had to vent the 
storage tank manually to reduce pressure and protect the tank integrity. Some 500 persons 
lived within a 500 m radius of the release (Ruckart et al., 2008). 
Figure 35. Damaged and overturned diesel storage tank at the ASCO Facility in Cameron, LA.  
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
5.4 Hurricane Ike, USA, 2008 
Hurricane Ike made landfall along the north end of Galveston Island, Texas, at 0700 UTC 
on 13 September. Ike weakened to a tropical storm on 13 September just east of Palestine, 
Texas, and then became extra-tropical when it interacted with a front on 14 September. 
The extra-tropical low moved quickly northeast, producing hurricane-force wind gusts 
across Arkansas, Missouri, and the Ohio Valley (Burleson et al., 2015). 
Media reports indicate that 21 people died in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas as a direct 
result of Ike. Twelve fatalities were reported in Galveston and Chambers Counties alone, 
where the worst storm surge occurred (Berg, 2009). As many as 64 additional indirect 
deaths were reported in Texas (e.g. due to electrocution, carbon monoxide poisoning, and 
pre-existing medical complications). The insured damage (not including inland flooding or 
storm surge) from Ike in Texas, Louisiana, and Arkansas topped 9.7 billion USD (Berg, 
2009). 
Significant storm surge and wave damage occurred along a large portion of the Texas and 
Louisiana coasts. The Bolivar Peninsula and parts of the Galveston Island were particularly 
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affected. Almost every structure on parts of the Bolivar Peninsula, including the 
communities of Crystal Beach, Gilchrist, and High Island, were completely razed from their 
foundations due to the surge and accompanying waves (Berg, 2009). Hurricane Ike 
downed power lines, flooded streets, wetlands and low-lying areas, tore roofs and windows 
from buildings, and damaged or destroyed emergency equipment. Following the storm, 
nearly two million people were without power (FEMA, 2008). In areas like Galveston Island 
and the Bolivar Peninsula, water and wastewater plants had to be rebuilt. 
Figure 36. Crumpled storage tanks in a marsh which were displaced by the storm surge of 
hurricane Ike in the Galveston area 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
The storm shut 14 oil refineries and two Texas strategic petroleum reserve sites, causing 
rising gas prices and gas shortages across parts of the United States (Berg, 2009). The 
Minerals Management Service (MMS), which oversaw oil production in federal waters 
offshore at the time, reported that the storm destroyed at least 52 oil platforms in the Gulf 
of Mexico, and additional 32 platforms suffered severe damage (FEMA, 2008). The damage 
to the industry went, however, far beyond the oil platforms and refineries. Eight chemical 
companies in an area referred to as “chemical row” were severely damaged by Ike; all but 
one had 4 to 10 ft of salt water inside the plants (FEMA, 2008). Figures 36 to 38 show 
damage to refineries and chemical industries due to the impact of Ike. 
Hurricane Ike caused hundreds of localized oil and other toxic spills that threatened fish 
and wildlife throughout the affected area (see Figures 39 to 42). The Environmental 
Protection Agency, U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), Texas General Land Office (GLO) and the 
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) formed a Unified Command for spill 
response, which assessed more than 200 pollution reports (i.e. 180 sites in the Houston-
Galveston area and 47 in the area from Port Arthur to Lake Charles). The type and amount 
of pollution included oil and diesel from vessels, as well as industrial chemicals (FEMA, 
2008). In total, 448 releases of oil, gasoline and other substances were reported by news 
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outlets (Amos, 2008). The worst spill totalled nearly 266,000 gallons of oil released from 
a battery of storage tanks on Goat Island, Texas (Amos, 2008). 
Figure 37. Atmospheric storage tanks collapsed in the Galveston/Houston area 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
Figure 38. Collapsed storage tanks while under construction in Beaumont, TX.  
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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Figure 39. Oil spills from storage tanks damaged by Hurricane Ike in Goat Island, TX 
 
Source: flickr/Skytruth 
Figure 40. Several hydrocarbon spills in the flooded area of Galveston after the passage of 
hurricane Ike 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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Figure 41. Toppled storage tanks and oil sheen in the Galveston area after the passage of 
hurricane Ike 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
Figure 42. Tanks floated and pipe joint separation at Chevron Lube Plant in Port Arthur where 
1041 barrels of lube oil spilled 
 
Source: NOAA Office of Response and Restoration 
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5.5 Super-typhoon Pongsona, Guam, 2002 
Either a build-up of static electricity or sparks caused the fire at the commercial port tank 
farm in Piti that ignited when Supertyphoon Pongsona pounded the island on 13 December 
2002 (Waldrop, 2003). 
At the Mobil tank facility, two tanks, one with gasoline and the other with jet fuel, erupted 
in flames. The fire burned for six days, and destroyed a total of four of the petroleum 
company's fuel storage tanks (Figure 43). Officials shut down gasoline sales to the public 
(Waldrop, 2003). 
Static electricity may have occurred inside one of the gasoline tanks at the Mobil facility 
due to friction caused by extremely high winds rushing through the ventilation system. The 
tank had previously been damaged in July of the same year, during typhoons Chata'an and 
Halong. The tank’s side walls buckled, preventing the free-floating internal roof from 
moving more than seven feet from the bottom of the tank, allowing accumulation of 
gasoline vapours inside the tank. Other tanks at different locations in the same facility 
showed buckling damage due to wind in the upper section (Waldrop, 2003). 
The tank that first caught fire contained less than 15 percent of its total capacity of 
unleaded gasoline. When flammable vapours ignited, the explosion projected the tank's 
roof in the air, causing it to travel for more than six hundred feet, before landing (Waldrop, 
2003).  
Figure 43. Storage tanks damaged and destroyed in Guam after the passage of Super-typhoon 
Pongsona 
 
Source: FEMA  
5.6 Cilacap refinery, Indonesia, 1995 
On October 24 1995, lightning struck the Indonesian oil refinery Petramina in Cilacap in 
the south coast of Java. Lightning struck the automatic gauging device of a 38,800 m³ 
fixed-roof tank being filled with kerosene at 43.5°C (temperature higher than the flash 
point), causing a fire. The reason was incomplete equipotential bonding, generating sparks 
that triggered the fire. The gaseous cloud over the tank exploded, destroying the roof. The 
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burning liquid spread the fire to six other tanks in the dike. Thousands of residents and 
400 staff members were evacuated and no victims were reported. Nearly 600 homes were 
damaged and some hundred water bodies were polluted. The fire was extinguished after 
three days. The damages were assessed at 560 million francs (BARPI, 2018b). 
The refinery which supplied 34% of Indonesian inland need was shut down for about 18 
months. Oil, petrol, kerosene and diesel, worth about 350,000 USD, had to be imported 
daily for the supply of Java (Hasse, 2000). 
5.7 Storm Surge, UK, 2013 
The winter of 2013–2014 over NW Europe was characterised by a powerful jet stream 
driving a succession of low pressure systems across the Atlantic Ocean (BARPI, 2015). The 
first of these major systems formed near Iceland on 4 December 2013 and deepened to 
form an intense easterly-tracking cyclone, passing across northern Scotland and 
accompanied by Beaufort Force 9 (strong gale) to 11 (violent storm) winds, on 5 
December. Severe coastal flooding was experienced on the west coast of North Wales, in 
NW England and on the west coast of Scotland. Into 6 December, the storm then moved 
across Southern Norway and Sweden, intensifying further to reach its lowest pressure of 
960 hPa over the Baltic Sea (Spencer et al., 2015).  
The storm surge affected the north-west coast of England, and on 5 and 6 December 2013, 
a storm surge coincided with high spring tides to produce similar water levels to those seen 
in the catastrophic East Coast Floods of 1953 on the east and south coasts of England. 
Four Seveso regulated establishments were extremely badly affected by the event. A large 
number of other industrial establishments was affected indirectly, partly because they 
halted production, but also because their logistics suffered impacts. Effective protection 
measures and adequate incident preparedness prevented a widespread disaster. Luckily, 
no hazardous material was released in any of the events presented. However, the severity 
of the impact, the recovery times and restoration costs suggest that important lessons can 
be learned from those “near misses” (BARPI, 2015). 
5.7.1 Inter Terminals Riverside Terminal 
Inter Terminals Riverside Terminal, is located on the north bank of the River Tees. The site 
provides bulk liquid chemical storage in above ground storage tanks with facilities to carry 
out import/export operations associated with shipping, road vehicle and pipeline transfers. 
With the site being located several miles inland from the east coast, the impact of the 
potential surge was not fully acknowledged until December 5. The storm surge caused a 
rise in the tidal river level to 4.3 m AOD4 which overtopped the flood defence and Billingham 
Beck. The water overtopping the wall also caused erosion of the barrier and lowered the 
effective protection level (Whitfield et al., 2015). 
As a consequence, the whole site was flooded to a depth of 1.8 m. Most of the bund walls 
were overtopped and several tanks with low inventory were displaced, damaging pipework 
and supports. Mobile equipment floated and moved with the inrush of flood water to cause 
impact on other stationary infrastructure. There was, however, no release of hazardous 
substances (BARPI, 2015). 
Following the event, the river defence embankment was raised to 4.85m AOD and work to 
protect the rest of the site boundary to this level was also planned. The final protection of 
the site should be for a flood with 100-year return period (BARPI, 2015). 
5.7.2 SABIC UK Brinefields 
SABIC UK Petrochemicals Limited manufactures bulk petrochemical products (ethylene, 
propylene, butadiene, cyclohexane, and benzene) at a number of plants on the Tees 
                                           
4 AOD: Above Ordnance Datum 
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Estuary. The Brinefield plant is part of an upper-tier Seveso site. Its storage facilities hold 
large inventories of products and intermediates. 
SABIC participated in the National Flood Preparation Exercise ‘Watermark’ in 2011 and the 
lessons learned from that exercise were incorporated into the existing emergency response 
protocols (Whitfield, et al., 2015). When flood warnings were received during the first week 
of December, SABIC implemented standard operating practices to prepare for the storm 
surge. These preparations included: emptying the effluent treatment facilities, isolation of 
all non-essential electrical equipment, sandbagging of vulnerable areas such as switch 
houses, and removal of all containers that could float. While some localised flooding 
occurred, it was considered manageable given that prior flood preparations had taken place 
(BARPI, 2015). 
The operators were, however not prepared for what happened next. It was unprecedented, 
unforeseen and therefore not planned for in any flood damage assessment or Seveso major 
accident scenario. A flash flood came from a nearby creek and headed toward the Cavities 
area, which stores thousands of tonnes of hydrocarbons in underground salt cavities. The 
Crisis Management Team was mobilized to initiate SABIC’s Crisis Management protocol 
(Whitfield et al., 2015). 
Damage inspection during low tide showed that all the equipment containing hazardous 
materials under pressure was secure and that there had been limited damage to the cavity 
wellheads and piping infrastructure. The major damage sustained was to the electrical 
distribution, instrumentation and control systems including all telemetry networks. Repair 
and replacement activities took 5 months. The SABIC insurance loss assessment was over 
£10 million (BARPI, 2015). 
5.7.3 Inter Terminals, Immingham 
Inter Terminals, Immingham, is located on the south bank of the River Humber. The site 
provides bulk liquid oil and chemical storage in above ground storage tanks. Its operations 
include transport by road, shipping, rail and pipeline. It is an upper-tier Seveso site. The 
Terminal is situated in a highly vulnerable flood zone (Whitfield et al., 2015). A flood risk 
assessment had been carried out and site plans with topographical information were 
available. Emergency response plans and evacuation plans were started in preparation for 
the storm surge. Just prior to the flood, precautions were taken to protect key equipment 
as much as possible and to restrict transfer operations. All operations were ceased and 
electrical power was isolated (BARPI, 2015). 
The surge caused a rise in the river level to 5.1 m AOD which overtopped the dock entrance 
gates and filled it until it overflowed into the dock estate. The terminals were inundated up 
to 1 m flood depth. The embankment protection itself failed in several places which caused 
a further flow into the terminal. None of the tank bund walls were overtopped and the 
bunds remained dry throughout the flood. Although mobile plant equipment was floated, 
there was little mechanical damage to infrastructure. There was no loss of containment of 
any hazardous product. The terminal remained inoperable during the immediate recovery 
period. The electrical infrastructure was badly affected and temporary power allowed only 
priority systems to be brought back on line (BARPI, 2015). 
5.8 Hurricane Harvey, USA, 2017 
Hurricane Harvey made landfall in Texas near Houston as a Category 4 hurricane, on 
August 24, 2017. This area home to more than 500 industrial sites and it is the centre of 
the oil and chemical industry in the US. Harvey knocked out about 25% of the U.S. refining 
capacity, and halved the nation's ethylene synthesis rate (Ward, 2017). It shut down 
onshore and offshore oil and natural gas production in southern Texas, and shut oil product 
storage terminals, as well as ports in both Texas and Louisiana (Newbery, 2017). Transport 
of oil and fuels trough pipeline was either closed or running at a reduced rate (Newbery, 
2017). 
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Following Harvey, the damaged refineries and other oil facilities released into the air and 
floodwaters millions of pounds of hazardous substances (Tabuchi and Kaplan, 2017), 
showing once more the tremendous combined impact of natural and technological hazards 
on society and the environment.  
5.8.1 The rain 
The amount of rain during Hurricane Harvey caused unprecedented flooding, when it made 
landfall in the Galveston Bay. In a four-day period, many areas received more than 60 
inches (1,500 mm) of rain (Trenberth et al., 2018). Harvey was the wettest tropical cyclone 
on record in the United States. In a briefing, the World Meteorological Organization stated 
that the quantity of rainfall from Harvey had very likely been increased by climate change 
(Trenberth et al., 2018). In a recent paper, Cruz and Krausmann (2013) describe how 
extreme weather and climate change could be a threat to the oil and gas sector. 
5.8.2 The damage 
Industrial facilities were damaged by wind or water with releases of hazardous substances. 
In more than a dozen Texas chemical and refining plants, damaged storage tanks, ruptured 
containment systems and broken pressure relief valves were reported (Ward, 2017). 
Among those, for at least 14 tanks damage occurred when their “floating roof” sank under 
the weight of the record rainfall (Blum, 2017).  
When Hurricane Harvey reached Texas, four 500-barrel steel tanks sprung free from their 
piping and toppled over at Burlington Resources, some 100 miles west of Houston (Eaton, 
2017).. Knocked down by the flood waters, the tanks tore flowlines and spilled hundreds 
of barrels of oil and waste water (Eaton, 2017). Two tanks floated at Magellan Galena Park 
Terminal in Houston and released their contents (approximately 11,000 barrels of gasoline) 
into the standing floodwater (Sutherland et al., 2018). 
5.8.3 The spills 
Benzene, vinyl chloride, butadiene and other known human carcinogens were among the 
dozens of tons of industrial toxic substances spilled in the wake of Harvey (Bajak and 
Olsen, 2018). Overall, more than 100 Harvey-related releases of toxics and chemicals were 
catalogued (Sutherland et al., 2018). 
The largest spill occurred at Magellan Midstream Partners Galena Park terminal, where two 
gasoline storage tanks failed after the site flooded (Sutherland et al., 2018). The company 
reported an impressive amount of fuel loss totalling 10,988 barrels (TCEQ, 2017). Other 
major releases include a spill of about 100,000 gallons (378 m3) of glycerine and 80,000 
gallons (300 m3) of methyl alcohol into the floodwaters at the Channel Biorefinery and 
Terminals (EIP, 2017). EnerVest Operating told state regulators its storage tanks spilled 
1,117 barrels of crude oil and wastewater at eight separate well sites in Fayette County 
(Eaton, 2017). Some of the crude flowed with the flood waters into the Colorado River. At 
least 15 energy companies spilled almost 2,000 barrels of oil and an unknown quantity of 
waste water in two dozen Harvey-related incidents (Eaton, 2017).  
Samples taken in sediments one month after the cyclone at Houston public parks showed 
elevated levels of dioxins, benzo(a)pyrene, PCBs (polychlorinated biphenyls) and 
hazardous chemicals typically created during the combustion of oil, coal and gas (Griggs 
et al., 2017).  
5.8.4 Rainwater treatment facilities overflows 
A waste oil spill occurred at Motiva Enterprises LLC in Port Arthur, when the wastewater 
treatment plant was flooded (Flitter, 2017). Nearly half a billion gallons of industrial 
wastewater mixed with storm water were released from a chemical plant in Baytown, east 
of Houston (Bajak and Olsen, 2018). The spills travelled on the floodwaters and were not 
contained. This release mechanism is very frequent in flood events and the hydrocarbons 
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that stratify on the floodwaters pose a serious fire hazard which is difficult to mitigate. For 
example, only one month earlier, tropical storm Calvin produced a flood at a PeMex refinery 
in Salina Cruz in Mexico, but this time the consequences were much more serious. 
Hydrocarbons from an overflowed wastewater treatment facility floated on the floodwaters 
until they found an ignition source. A huge fire started in which one operator was killed 
and many others were injured (Pemex, 2017). 
5.8.5 Contaminated sites 
More than two dozen current and former toxic waste sites, whose grounds are 
contaminated with dioxins, lead, arsenic, benzene or other compounds from industrial 
activities are hosted in Harris County (Tabuchi and Kaplan, 2017). At least 14 of these 
were affected by the flooding or damaged by Hurricane Harvey (Griggs et al., 2017). Even 
liquid mercury appears to have washed or blown ashore east of Houston, a few hundred 
yards from the San Jacinto Waste Pits, in the aftermath of Hurricane Harvey (Healy and 
Kaplan, 2017). Contaminated sites, as well as tailing dams, are known to be vulnerable 
during flood events. Nevertheless, little has been done to mitigate the risk they pose to 
the environment and to the public, should they release their contaminant into the 
floodwaters. A better regulation that aims to ensure some level of protection is required. 
In particular measures should be taken to reduce the lifespan of these sites. Because of 
the large number of sites that has to be treated, remediation activities usually last for 
decades. The longer those sites are idle, waiting for decontamination, the more flood 
events are likely to wash those contaminants into the environment. 
5.8.6 Shut-down and restart 
One of the main lessons from Harvey is that there can be contamination even without an 
accident. A large portion of the substances released during Harvey were produced by the 
burning (flaring) of fuels and chemicals during shut-down and restart operations. Among 
the 102 releases reported to the authorities, 44 originated from the facilities’ flare 
(Sutherland et al., 2018). A temporary increase in pollution can be tolerated by the 
environmental authorities in critical circumstances. However, the area of Houston is home 
to more than 500 industrial activities, many of which are petrochemical industries, power 
plants and refineries and significant air pollution will occur when these facilities shut down 
or restart at the same time. A giant plastics plant in Point Comfort released, alone, about 
1.3 million pounds of excess emissions, including toxic gases like benzene, when it 
restarted after the storm (Griggs et al., 2017). Consequently, areas with a high density of 
refineries and petrochemical industries, such as Houston, should have a recovery plan with 
a schedule for restart operations to avoid the emissions caused by the simultaneous 
restarting of all facilities. 
5.8.7 Communication and emergency response 
Harvey highlighted a need to improve communications between authorities and the 
industry during natural disasters. With a few exceptions, companies with spills did not call 
local emergency responders which meant that the public was not informed in real time 
about incidents that could have affected them (Bajak and Olsen, 2018). Regulatory filings 
were, thus, incomplete and represented only damage that produced excessive air pollution. 
Even when the public was alerted, there was a tendency to understate the real extent of 
the release. The largest gasoline release due to Harvey was dramatically underestimated 
at first. Oil company Magellan reported that the spill effectively reached almost 11,000 
barrels (about ten times the amount initially declared), only four days after the spill had 
occurred. Because of the flooding, the site was not accessible by the plant operators, who 
then underestimated the spill amount and returned a wrong assessment to the authorities 
(Sutherland et al., 2018).   
In situations like these, a lack of a proper assessment and of communication could have 
resulted in wrong decision making, preventing authorities from initiating proper emergency 
procedures (e.g. shelter in place, evacuation) and from informing the population on how 
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to behave during the emergency. On top of this, oil companies are only required to report 
chemical spills to state regulators in the US, and wastewater contaminated with 
hydrocarbon is not included (Eaton, 2017). Therefore, it is very hard to assess how much 
oil, chemicals and fuels really flowed into the floodwaters. Harvey demonstrated once again 
the need for a response plan designed to cope with Natech events and to address a 
situation in which the impact of a natural hazard can hamper the response operations. 
Emergency response plans for spills of hazardous materials should take natural hazard 
impact into consideration. 
5.8.8 Fire and explosion at Arkema 
A series of explosions and fires occurred at a chemical facility in Crosby, when the site was 
flooded. Some policemen were hospitalized after inhaling the noxious smoke. The explosion 
was caused by thermal degradation an organic peroxide, a very reactive substance that 
requires to be stored in special refrigerated containers (Sutherland et al., 2018). The 
facility lost its primary power supply when the floodwaters started to rise in their perimeter. 
Operators turned the emergency back-up generators on to keep the refrigerators running, 
but they also failed when the flood level rose. Finally, operators transferred the substances 
into refrigerated trucks, used to transport the substance, to gain some time. At the same, 
time an evacuation was set for an area of 1.5 miles (2.4 km) around the facility. Eventually 
the temperature of the substance rose, until it started to decompose through an explosive 
reaction that led to the explosions and the fires. Five police officers that drove through the 
evacuation zones to respond to a call were hospitalized after inhaling noxious fumes coming 
from the facility (Sutherland et al., 2018). 
This accident showed the inadequacy of conventional emergency measures at chemical 
facilities, which are planned with insufficient consideration of natural hazards. The 
identification of specific plans that take into consideration the particular features of Natech 
events should be required. 
5.9 La Plata refinery fire, Argentina 
On April 2, 2013, the city of La Plata faced the worst flood in its history in the wake of a 
major storm. The magnitude of the storm was such that production at the La Plata refinery, 
the country’s biggest refinery and operated by Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), had 
to be stopped and "safe conditions" established. However, the amount of water 
overwhelmed the storm drainage system at the refinery, resulting in hydrocarbons being 
washed out of the drains and around the site (Marsh, 2014). They hydrocarbons found an 
ignition source, resulting in the largest fire the facility had ever experienced (Moreno, 
2015).  
An explosion in the crude distillation unit (CDU) was caused by hydrocarbons igniting in 
one of the coke furnaces. The furnaces had been shut down, but were still hot enough to 
ignite the hydrocarbons. There were two fires in the CDU and one in the coke oven (Marsh, 
2014). It was indicated that aging and a lack of safety measures could have contributed 
to the accident (Moreno, 2015). 
The accident also highlighted the difficulty associated with emergency response during 
natural-disaster conditions. Since the refinery was flooded, employees engaged in 
emergency response were unable to access the locker room to wear the proper security 
clothing. Some left without the proper clothing or equipment to try to fight the flames in 
the flooded area, with the risk of catching fire themselves. Moreno (2015) indicates, that 
the situation was such that the morale of the men was broken, some of them arriving in a 
state of panic.  
Overall, about 40 fire fighters were involved in first response which was probably 
insufficient considering that two blocks of land burned with flames of 70 m height. Also, 
many of the fire fighters were not trained for this type of fire and incorrect response 
procedures may have been applied (Moreno, 2015). For example, fire fighters began to 
attack the areas of the accumulator and the plant with burning gases, before the gas flow 
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was shut. As a consequence, each time the fire fighters extinguished the flames, the 
flammable gases dispersed and ignited again in puffs of fire (Moreno, 2015). It took 
responders ten hours to completely extinguish and control the fire. Luckily, there were no 
fatalities or injuries, but the estimated costs for reconstruction were 500 million USD 
(Marsh, 2014). The fire left the topping plant only partially functional, and the coke plant 
completely destroyed (Moreno, 2015). 
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6 Damage mode analysis 
The previous sections showed that storms can cause significant damage to industrial 
installations and in particular to their storage facilities. In this section, we attempt to 
summarize the main damage modes that manifested in past storm-triggered Natech events 
as a function of the different storm effects. In particular, we will focus on damage modes 
for large storage tanks designed to hold hazardous materials. Not only are storage tanks 
the type of equipment with the highest frequency of releases due to natural disasters and 
storms, but they also contain the largest quantities of hazardous materials in industrial 
establishments. Because of this, both the likelihood and severity Natech events are higher 
for storage tanks than for any other piece of equipment. Due to their length, pipes and 
pipelines are also vulnerable to storm events. Table 4 summarizes the damage modes and 
puts them into relation with the natural event action that triggered them. 
Table 4. Damage modes triggered by storm events 
 Heavy rainfall 
and flash flood 
Storm surge Lightning Strong wind 
Sinking of floating roof x  x  
Damage to electrical 
equipment 
x x x  
Power loss x x x x 
Flotation x x   
Displacement  x x  x 
Vessel buckling x x  x 
Impact with floating 
objects 
x x   
Ignition of flammables x  x x 
Thermal puncturing of 
containment 
  x  
Roof damage x  x x 
Impact with airborne 
objects 
   x 
Displacement  x x  x 
Falling objects    x 
Source: JRC 
6.1 Roof damage 
Roof damage can occur during the strongest windstorms and tropical storms. The strongest 
winds were not only able to damage the external insulation, removing entire sections from 
several equipment items during the most recent hurricanes, but they also ripped off thinner 
metal plates from their main roof structures. Damage to the roofs of atmospheric tanks 
was associated with wind suctions in that part of a tank, with the highest pressures 
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occurring on the windward meridian at the junction with the cylinder and at the centre of 
the roof. Many of the storage tanks damaged by hurricanes Katrina and Rita showed 
different degrees of roof damage (Godoy, 2007). 
6.2 Falling objects 
When tall structures like chimneys, racks, towers and buildings collapse, they can involve 
other structures and equipment when falling. Not only structures, but also mobile objects 
can do a significant amount of damage if they fall from a height. Manufactured objects can 
tear loose from the highest sections of tall building because of wind actions. Natural 
objects, like stones and rocks may fall from cliffs right above the establishments. An 
example of this type of damage is the oil spill at Shell Pilot Town during hurricane Katrina 
(section 5.2.3), in which a falling microwave tower punctured one of the storage tanks 
triggering a release. 
6.3 Vessel buckling 
The shell buckling of the highest section of equipment, and in particular of storage tanks, 
is frequently caused by high winds during storms and hurricanes, while buckling of the 
lower section is more likely due to floods (Godoy, 2007). 
Vessels that suffered buckling during tropical storms had very large deflections in the 
cylindrical part and in the base plate. In these cases, wind damage of tanks occurred in 
peripheral locations in a plant, where the tanks were more exposed (NIST, 2006). Buckling 
can cause tears in the plates composing the vessel, from which the contained material can 
escape. Buckling can be accompanied by leakage of the content due to failure of the 
bottom/shell welding, manhole failure, pipe/fitting failure or failure of riveted seams 
(Cooper, 1997). 
When a vessel is empty, the structure is at its lowest strength against buckling and it is 
vulnerable to either wind or water pressure. Ring stiffeners may reduce the risk of tank 
deflections. In past hurricane events, tanks with ring stiffeners did not exhibit buckling, 
even in areas where buckling damage was instead observed in unreinforced tanks (Godoy, 
2007). 
Godoy (2016) highlights the three main parameters that drive the buckling of atmospheric 
vertical storage tanks: the tank shape (height on diameter ratio), the distribution (spacing, 
relative position and pattern) of tank groups and topographic effects (e.g. hills, 
containment dikes). 
Many examples of this damage mode are available for hurricanes Hugo, Katrina and Rita 
(sections 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3). Supertyphoon Pongsona and its damage in the island of Guam 
(section 5.5) shows another interesting example of shell buckling damage. 
6.4 Displacement 
Displacement of equipment and pipes is one of the most common damage modes during 
natural disasters. In storms, strong winds with speeds of several hundred km/hour can 
drag lighter objects, while in the areas affected by flooding buoyant equipment can be 
dragged along by the water current or by winds (Godoy, 2007). Some very intense tropical 
storms were reported to have toppled slender structures and storage tanks, under the 
combined effect of strong winds and rising floodwaters (Godoy, 2007) (see hurricanes 
Katrina, Rita and Ike in sections 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4). In case of storm surge, high-momentum 
tides can slam into objects, pushing and overturning them without actually needing to lift 
them. Displaced equipment items can hit any other object in their path. This often results 
in further damage to the stationary object, to the displaced item or to both of those (Godoy, 
2007). 
Usually, when storage and process equipment is displaced, the piping system is dragged 
along, usually also sustaining damage. Pipes can be breached, bent or torn, while flanges 
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and fittings can lose their seal (Cooper, 1997). Storms can also directly affect pipes and 
pipelines.  
6.5 Damage to electrical equipment 
Electrical equipment is responsible for the correct functioning of the processes of industrial 
activities. Water intrusion can cause short circuits that can destroy electrical equipment or 
disrupt their functions. Flooding also seriously affects the functioning of uninterruptible 
power supply (UPS) and back-up power generators (see Fires and explosions at Arkema, 
section 5.8.11). All transformers and inverters, as well as all electric motors and ovens are 
at risk. In addition, the control room of an industrial activity, as well as most sensors, 
actuators, alarms and transmitters, are either electric or rely on electrical equipment for 
functioning. 
Water can enter electrical facilities during heavy rain or floods. Less frequently, storm 
surge was also responsible for extensive damage to the electrical equipment of installations 
built on the coast. Short-circuits can generate electric arcs and ignite flammable materials 
floating on the water or hovering in the air. Lightning strikes can damage electric 
components either through current surge or via electromagnetic pulse (EMP) (Hasse, 
2000).  
6.6 Flotation 
Uplifting of vessels and tanks mainly due to buoyancy forces is the main flood-induced 
failure mode for empty or nearly empty storage tanks following flood, flash flood and storm 
surge events (Krausmann and Salzano, 2017). Vertical forces are able to bend equipment 
and pipes, break connections or flanges. Even large storage tanks were forced out of their 
foundations by the massive storm surge that followed the strongest storms (Santella et 
al., 2010). Floating equipment can be carried by the water current, hitting any other 
objects in their path, including parts of the industrial facility itself. To avoid damage due 
to flotation, anchoring systems may be installed on critical equipment. Empty vessels are 
reported to be much more vulnerable to flotation. For this reason, it is recommended to fill 
empty vessels with water in preparation for a storm or a flood (Krausmann et al., 2011). 
The oil spill at Murphy oil (section 5.2.1) is a perfect example of damage due to flotation. 
6.7 Impact with floating objects 
Objects floating on floodwaters can contain high momentum due to the water current they 
are carried along with. In case of storm surge, strong wind and waves can grant additional 
motion to floating objects. Impacting objects can buckle vessels, puncture through metal 
enclosures, bend steel structures and break pipe connections (Krausmann and Salzano, 
2017). The water can carry any floating item, tank, barrel, vehicle, tree or building away. 
Objects from both inside and outside an industrial establishment can damage industrial 
equipment and trigger Natechs. A storm surge can bring onshore large vessels, barges and 
floating oil rigs. Good practices recommend the removal of all unnecessary floating objects 
from the establishments in preparation for a storm or a flood event (Santella et al., 2010; 
USCSB, 2005). 
The oil spill at Sundown Energy during hurricane Katrina (section 5.2.5) is a perfect 
example of this damage mechanism as a barge carried by the storm surge grounded inside 
the facility, damaging equipment and breaking pipes. 
6.8 Impact with airborne objects 
The strong winds of a windstorm, hurricane or tornado can carry any sort of object when 
the air reaches a very high speed (NIST, 2006). These objects, even if usually not big in 
size, have a very high momentum because of their high velocity and can damage 
equipment upon impact. In addition, some airborne objects have sharp edges that increase 
their potential damaging capability (TRAS 320, 2015).  
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6.9 Sinking of floating roof 
When a floating roof of a tank sinks, the exposed liquid can evaporate, releasing large 
quantities of toxic, carcinogenic or pollutant substances into the air. Exposed flammable 
liquid can ignite, setting the entire tank on fire and projecting plumes of noxious smoke in 
the air (Krausmann and Salzano, 2017).  
In the event of rainfall, open-topped atmospheric floating roof tanks can collect large 
amounts of water on the deck of their floating roofs. Water is drained through a dedicated 
drainage system, which is designed to prevent water accumulation on top of the tank. 
However, when the amount of rain exceeds the design limit of the equipment, or if the 
system does not function properly, water starts to accumulate on the deck, up to the point 
in which the weight on the roof exceed its buoyancy force and the roof sinks in the liquid 
beneath (Blum, 2017). Installation of a geodesic dome is a possible solution for preventing 
floating roof flooding due to intense rainfall (API, 2012). During hurricane Harvey at least 
14 floating roofs of atmospheric storage tanks failed under the heavy rain and released 
noxious vapours in the air (see section 5.8). 
Wind can also be responsible for floating roof damage and sinking. Wind pressure can 
cause the water on tank to accumulate on a side, creating an uneven load and causing the 
structural failure of the roof (Krausmann and Salzano, 2017). Three records in TAD 
specifically refer to damage to floating roofs due to high wind. This type of damage 
occurred when the tanks were nearly full and the roofs at their highest position.  
An uncontrolled fire on the roof (e.g. spill on roof fire or rim seal fire) can also cause 
floating roof damage and sinking. Lightning strikes and friction between the roof and the 
tank walls which can cause sparks, are the main starters of fires on tank roofs (Hasse, 
2000; Waltrop, 2003). 
6.10 Power loss 
Electricity is a critical utility for the proper operation of an industrial installation and it is a 
lifeline that might be unavailable due to natural hazard conditions. This includes the 
primary power grid, but also back-up generators. Cable snapping, short circuits and floods 
are frequent causes of onsite power loss at industrial installations. As documented in past 
events, power loss alone can trigger a Natech accident (BARPI, 2009). Other examples of 
Natech events due to power loss are reported by Ruckart et al., (2008). In addition, safety 
systems and barriers implemented to prevent or mitigate accidents may be unavailable 
due to lack of electricity. 
6.11 Breach/overfill 
Flooding of entire areas of industrial installations handling liquid fuels, and in particular of 
oil refineries, may cause the overflow of water with residual hydrocarbons from the sumps 
of the storm water drainage systems. Such systems are designed to separate water from 
hydrocarbon residues, which are collected and stored. In case of heavy rain or flood, such 
containers overfill with water, while the lighter hydrocarbons float on the floodwater (see 
section 5.8.4). The resulting oil spills may subsequently ignite and start huge 
conflagrations such as the fire at the La Plata YPF refinery (Section 5.9). 
6.12 Ignition of flammables 
Some natural hazards can locally generate sparks due to friction or electric currents, which 
in turn can ignite flammable materials. Lightning strikes are responsible for a very high 
number of fires at oil refineries every year (see section 5.6). Wind can also create friction 
between mobile metal parts, generating sparks that can also ignite flammable vapours 
(see section 5.5). Counterintuitively, flooding at industrial facilities can also create a source 
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of ignition, since flooded electrical equipment, like transformers, engines or substations, is 
likely to generate short circuits and sparks (see section 5.9). 
6.13 Thermal puncturing of metal enclosures 
Lightning strikes can melt or vaporize a small portion of material at its striking point. A 
sufficiently energetic direct lightning strike can create holes in metal enclosures of vessels 
and pipes and cause the loss of the containment function. Thicker metal plates can resist 
better to puncturing than thinner metal sheets (Necci et al., 2013).   
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7 Lessons learned and recommendations 
In regions prone to storms with extreme intensity, controlling the risk of processing, storing 
or transporting hazardous substances can be very difficult. Based on the analysis in the 
previous sections, here we present a number of lessons and recommendations that can be 
used to more effectively manage the risk from storm-triggered technological accidents. 
The lessons generated from the analysis are as follows: 
 When violent storms hit, several facilities may be affected simultaneously 
overwhelming the capacity of responders to cope with the disaster; 
 Storage equipment is the most vulnerable to storm damage; 
 Fires and explosions are the most common consequence scenarios; 
 Lightning is the most frequent cause of storm-triggered Natech accidents; 
 Rain and flood can also trigger Natech accidents with a high frequency, and these 
events result in the highest costs and the highest damage to the environment; 
 The effects of wind are the least probable to trigger Natech events, end even when 
they do they usually have a lower severity if compared with other effects; 
 Not only is the loss of the power supply due to storms sufficient, by itself, to trigger 
Natech events, but emergency response and the initial recovery phase can also be 
seriously hampered by the lack of electricity supply;  
 Planning for emergencies requires consideration of the possible natural events, 
otherwise insufficient or inadequate emergency procedures can exacerbate the 
severity of an accident, instead of mitigating it; 
 Storm predictions based on past events are not sufficient to be well prepared for 
future storm–triggered Natechs, in particular in the face of climate change. 
The following is a set of recommendations for better preparedness against storm-triggered 
Natechs: 
 Industrial facilities should be better protected from the effect of storms, and in 
particular storage tanks; 
 An effective response to storms can be better achieved if emergency exercises include 
storm-triggered Natech scenarios; 
 Emergency plans should use early warnings as trigger points to initiate emergency 
procedures and the triggering conditions should be clear; 
 Risk assessments and emergency plans should be reviewed on a regular basis 
to ensure they are up to date in particular in view of climate change; 
 Operators should provide reliable backup electric power supply and ensure that 
the backup power does not fail under the same condition as the primary power supply; 
 Worst case storm events should not be predicted as if they were a recurrence of events 
that already happened in the past; instead, industry should increase safety factors 
to account for changes (both actual and potential) in the environment and in the 
climate; 
 Areas with a high density of refineries and chemical facilities should have local 
recovery plans with a schedule for restart operations to avoid simultaneous 
emissions and preserve air quality; 
 Responders should prepare for scenarios in which they have insufficient resources 
to cope with all the simultaneous events, and their management should learn how to 
decide priority targets for intervention. 
Another recommendation regards industrial plants which survived the impact of an extreme 
storm by being in a state of shutdown while riding out the storm. Given that restarting 
after an emergency shutdown is probably the most hazardous operation for industry (even 
more so if the facilities suffered damage in the storm), plant operators should handle start-
ups with extreme caution. The U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) 
issued a safety bulletin for precautions needed during oil and chemical facility start-up 
following hurricanes. The precautions include checklists of equipment, tanks, and 
instrumentation to be examined for damage prior restart (USCSB, 2005). Particular 
attention should be given to examining large bulk storage tanks and pressure vessels for 
54 
evidence of floating displacement or damage. In addition, different types of equipment 
items should be examined for trapped floodwater and debris-impact damage, for example: 
sewers, drains, furnace systems, electric motors and drives, switchgear, conduit, electrical 
boxes, electronic and pneumatic instrumentation, emergency warning systems, emergency 
equipment, and insulation systems for piping, vessels, and tanks (USCSB, 2005). 
In addition, operators should coordinate with government entities responsible for civil 
protection and air quality in order to minimize the exposition of the public to simultaneous 
flare emissions due to bulk shut-down and start-up operations, which could be a threat to 
human health and to the environment, even in the absence of an accident. 
Considering that rain and flood events have the potential to trigger accidents with the 
highest consequences, the following are flood-specific lessons and recommendations based 
on our analysis and a study conducted by Krausmann et al. (2011): 
 Flood defence structures can fail completely during floods and cannot be relied on in 
case of extreme flooding. Different layers of protection should be implemented to 
compensate; 
 De-inventorying of storage tanks can reduce the impact of accidental spills. 
However, it can also increase the vulnerability of the tanks to floating and thus the 
likelihood of spills in case tanks are not completely empty; 
 To avoid floating, empty storage tanks could be partially filled with water. This 
necessitates the implementation of safety procedures to avoid contamination, reaction 
or other damage and, therefore, requires early warning; 
 Adequate anchoring with bolts or other types of restraining systems should 
effectively prevent tanks and other equipment from floating off their foundations for 
most flood conditions; 
 In preparation for a flood, objects that can float and become a threat to other parts 
of the facility should either be secured or removed where possible. 
 The drainage system for waste flammable substances and surface run-off water should 
be segregated. 
 It would be sensible land-use planning practice to relocate hazardous industry 
to areas that are not flood-prone. Where this is not possible, safety-critical 
equipment or high-risk units should be placed outside the estimated inundation zone. 
 Measures should be taken to quickly remediate decommissioned contaminated 
sites to avoid that flood events wash contaminants into the environment. 
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8 Conclusions 
This study analysed past technological incidents involving hazardous materials caused by 
the impact of storms. The study concluded that incidents caused by storms were frequent 
and resulted often but not always in consequences to people, the environment and the 
economy. 
The different types of storm events were analysed with respect to their ability to leave a 
“damage footprint” on the ground. A number of effects are responsible for damage to the 
natural and built environment. The study concluded that the main effects responsible for 
damage are: strong winds, heavy precipitation, lightning and storm surge. 
A large number of technological incidents were collected and analysed to get a statistical 
description of storm-triggered events. Several accident databases were consulted and 
analysed to identify Natech events and in particular storm-triggered accidents. The main 
finding of this study is that the relative occurrence of storm triggered Natech events 
appears to have increased when compared to the occurrence of technological incidents 
from other causes. Another important conclusion of this analysis is the high vulnerability 
of storage tanks to all the effects of storms. In addition, while lightning is the most frequent 
trigger of incidents, rain and flood is responsible for the largest losses. 
The number of storm-triggered incidents recorded over the last years could have been 
lower if natural hazards were not underestimated during both facility design and operation. 
The lessons and recommendations identified in the frame of this study should help to 
prevent such events in the future and to better mitigate their consequences. 
In addition, although a proactive attitude of the industry is required to prevent incidents, 
other actors, such as engineering companies, manufacturers, workers’ unions, authorities 
and policy makers need to work together to build a safer future for industries handling 
hazardous materials in natural hazard prone areas.  
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